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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is taken from the denial of the defendants 
Motion to Suppress after a hearing in the Third Circuit Court, Sandy 
City Department, on January 22, 1990, the Honorable Roger A. 
Livingston presiding. On October 21, 1989, Bryan K. Small was 
arrested on the charges of Theft and Vehicle Burglary. On March 26, 
1990, Small was convicted of the charges following a trial to the 
bench. 
On May 21, 1990, Judge Livingston sentenced Small on Count 
I to pay a $400.00 fine, and 90 days jail suspended upon 18 months 
probation to the Court, 48 hours community service, $200.00 attorney 
fee and completion of a course at Western Corrections. On Count II, 
Judge Livingston sentenced Small to 90 days jail, suspended upon 18 
months probation to the Court under the same conditions. 
This appeal was filed on June 13, 1990. No other prior or 
related appeals have been filed. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990), whereby a defendant in 
a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment in a Circuit Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on October 21, 1989, the 
defendant, Bryan K. Small, walked out of the Santa Fe Apartments 
complex (6936 South 1570 East) and continued walking on Fort Union 
Boulevard. (Transcript — hereinafter "T" — at 12-13). Small is a 
black man. (T: 31). Small had been visiting friends who reside at 
the Santa Fe Apartments and was leaving. (T: 14). 
Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Hudson was patrolling the 
area in his patrol car at that time and observed Small walking out 
of the apartment complex. (T: 13). Deputy Hudson did not know Small 
and had no knowledge of any criminal activity having recently 
occurred in the area. (T: 31; 33; 37). Deputy Hudson did not 
believe that Small was trying to hide from him nor did he believe 
that Small was committing any crime. (T: 32). Nevertheless, Deputy 
Hudson considered Small suspicious because of the lateness of the 
hour, the high crime rate in the area and because Small exited the 
apartment complex on "a walkway between two entrances, a pathway 
that is not a normal pathway for someone to come out next to an 
apartment building." (T: 13; 24; 32). 
Based on these suspicions, Deputy Hudson made a U-turn with 
his patrol car on Fort Union Boulevard and stopped Small who was 
walking on the sidewalk. (T: 29). Deputy Hudson asked Small to 
speak to him and Small turned around and walked back to Deputy 
Hudson's patrol car. (T: 34). Deputy Hudson asked Small to remain 
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there and demanded Smalls name, date of birth, address and an 
explanation of his actions at that time and place. (T: 34-35). 
Small gave Deputy Hudson his name and an explanation of his 
actions. Small was in possession of picture I.D., but because Small 
did not have a drivers license in his possession, Deputy Hudson ran 
a warrants and license check. (T: 14; 27). Deputy Hudson was then 
informed by his radio dispatcher that there were three outstanding 
warrants against Small. (T: 15). Deputy Hudson then placed Small 
under arrest for the warrants. (T: 17). 
Sometime after 4:00 a.m. Salt Lake County Deputy Fontaine 
was dispatched to the Santa Fe Apartments to investigate a reported 
vehicle burglary. (T: 46). During the course of his investigation, 
Deputy Fontaine heard over the dispatch radio in his patrol car that 
Deputy Hudson had stopped and arrested someone in the vicinity who 
matched a description of someone seen near the burglarized vehicle. 
(T: 47-48). Deputy Fontaine then instructed Deputy Hudson to hold 
Small at the scene of the stop on Fort Union Boulevard until he 
arrived with the reporting witness. (T: 48). Small remained inside 
Deputy Hudson's patrol car and was identified by the witness 
transported there by Deputy Fontaine. (T: 50). Small was then 
transported to the Salt Lake County Jail. (T: 50). 
Deputy Fontaine continued the investigation of the reported 
vehicle burglary. Small was asked by Deputy Hudson where his car 
was parked, and Deputy Fontaine located a vehicle registered to 
Small in the vicinity. (T: 50). Deputy Fontaine investigated the 
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vehicle and based on evidence located there proceeded to the Salt 
Lake County Jail and charged Small with Theft and Vehicle 
Burglary.1 (T: 50). 
1
 Property taken from the burglarized vehicle was 
identified and seized from Small's vehicle at this time. The items 
seized were introduced by the State as evidence at trial held on 
March 26, 1990. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Small contends on appeal that Sheriffs deputies lacked 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Small to justify the 
stop and detention of Small on Fort Union Boulevard. Small further 
contends that because the stop was unjustified, the trial court 
erred in denying Small's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained 
against him as a result of the stop. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEPUTY HUDSON LACKED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO 
JUSTIFY THE STOP OF SMALL 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . ." The Utah Constitution, in Article I, §14, 
provides this same guarantee with essentially the same language. 
Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990) provides: 
§77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect - Grounds. A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Courts look to the facts of each case to determine whether the 
constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion" exists to justify 
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the stop and detention of an individual. State v, Sierra, 754 P. 2d 
972, 975 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). 
The constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search 
and seizure apply to investigatory stops that fall short of official 
arrest. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987)• A 
seizure occurs when a reasonable person remains, not in the spirit 
of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he 
believes he is not free to leave based on the totality of 
circumstances, including any showing of force or authority by the 
officer. :id. In the case at bar, the stop and detention of Small 
prior to his arrest by Deputy Hudson constitutes a seizure because 
Small could not reasonably have believed under the circumstances 
that he was free to ignore Deputy Hudson or leave. 
First, Deputy Hudson visibly altered his course of travel 
by making a U-turn in his patrol car to stop Small. Deputy Hudson 
was not involved in an ongoing criminal investigation, had no 
reports of criminal activity at that time and had never met Small. 
Thus, by his acts, Deputy Hudson initiated a criminal investigation 
of Small. Cf., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (Officer 
did not "stop" bystanders by speaking to them during the course of 
an ongoing burglary investigation). 
Second, Deputy Hudson told Small to stop, reverse 
direction, come back to his patrol car and present identification, 
his name, date of birth, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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Deputy Hudson did not tell Small he was free to leave and, on 
cross-examination, admitted that he expected Small to stay and talk 
to him. (T: 34-35). Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990), 
authorizes a peace officer to take these actions only when he has a 
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is or has been involved 
in criminal activity. 
Third, Small provided his real name, address and an 
explanation of his actions to Deputy Hudson. Deputy Hudson 
conducted a warrants check through his radio dispatcher because 
Small did not have a driver's license in his possession, although he 
did have a picture I.D. (T: 14; 27). Through the warrants check 
Deputy Hudson learned that warrants existed in Small7s name and 
arrested him for them. A warrants check is not authorized under 
§77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990), and there is no record that Deputy 
Hudson suspected Small was providing false information. Utah courts 
have ruled that detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Deitman, 739 
P.2d at 617. The warrants check is a further act by Deputy Hudson 
indicating that a constitutional seizure of Small occurred prior to 
discovery of the warrants on which he was arrested. As such, the 
seizure must be justified under §77-7-15 by articulated facts that 
create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Small. 
Utah courts have ruled that evidence discovered after a 
stop cannot be used to justify the stop. State v. Baird# 763 P.2d 
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1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). Deputy Hudson testified at the 
suppression hearing that he stopped Small because he considered him 
"unusual". (T: 32). He considered him unusual because of the late 
hour, incidences of crime in the area the week prior, and because 
Small exited the apartment complex on a walkway between two 
entrances that Deputy Hudson considered unusual. (T: 24; 32). 
Deputy Hudson further testified that he did not think Small was 
committing a crime (T: 32), that he did not know Small nor that 
there were warrants for his arrest (T: 32), that Small was not 
hiding (T: 32) and that Small did not attempt to run away or evade 
him (T: 33). These facts do not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity by Small. 
In State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Swanigan's Motion 
to Suppress. The court ruled that "reasonable suspicion" did not 
exist where two men were walking in a residential neighborhood at 
1:40 a.m. where a burglary had been reported earlier that evening. 
The men matched a description of men seen in the same neighborhood 
contemporaneously with the burglary report two hours earlier who had 
"stared" at an officer as he drove by. The officer conducted a 
warrants check and searched the men upon discovery of an outstanding 
warrant on Swanigan. Evidence obtained pursuant to that search was 
ruled inadmissible by the Supreme Court. 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), the 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of 
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Trujillo's Motion to Suppress. The court ruled that "reasonable 
suspicion" did not exist where three men were walking at 3:40 a.m. 
in a business district where there is a high crime rate and 
Trujillo, upon seeing the police officer, abandoned a knapsack 
behind a garbage can. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Carpena7s Motion 
to Suppress. The court ruled that "reasonable suspicion" did not 
exist where a slowly moving automobile with out-of-state plates 
entered residential property at 3:00 a.m. in a neighborhood where a 
number of burglaries had recently occurred. All of these cases are 
similar on their facts to the case at bar, and the court's rationale 
that reasonable suspicion did not exist to justify the stops applies 
with added force to the facts of the present case. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Deputy Hudson lacked 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Small to justify the 
stop and detention under §77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990). Thus, the 
stop was made in violation of Small's constitutional rights against 
unreasonable seizure. U. S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, 
§14. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY EXPLOITATION OF 
AN IMPERMISSIBLE STOP MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
Small's identity was the initial evidence obtained against 
him as a result of his admission to Deputy Hudson after the stop. 
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Some time later, having been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car, 
Small was identified at the scene by the complaining witness who had 
seen a black man near the burglarized vehicle earlier in the 
evening. Following the identification by the complaining witness, 
Small admitted the location of his car to deputies Hudson and 
Fontaine. Deputy Fontaine and the complaining witness located 
Small's car based on Small's admission of its location, and Deputy 
Fontaine confirmed its ownership based on Small's admission of his 
own identity. The car was then searched and property located inside 
that was identified by the complaining witness as having been stolen. 
Evidence derived from the illegal seizure of Small is not 
admissible against him at trial. See, e.g., Swanigan# 699 P.2d at 
719. The evidence against Small in the present case was obtained 
pursuant to the illegal stop and, as such, should have been 
suppressed by the trial court on Small's Motion to Suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The initial stop of Small by Deputy Hudson was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity pursuant to 
§77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. (1990). As such, it constitutes an illegal 
seizure of Small. U. S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, §14. 
All evidence derived from the unconstitutional seizure is 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings against Small. 
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For any or all of the foregoing reasons the appellant, 
BRYAN K. SMALL, respectfully appeals to this Court to reverse the 
trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress and order that the 
charges in the present case be dismissed against him. 
DATED this £-!< day of October, 1990. 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT / J 
Attorney for Defenaarrfy 
Appellant 
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